

A STUDY OF TREASON*

By A. M. MEERLOO

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I. INTRODUCTION

Escapers like myself all experience great difficulty in ordering their reminiscences. Therefore I want to apologize for not being able to give the facts in the proper scientific way. We all suffer from a certain kind of emotional amnesia and do not find it easy to recollect our unpleasant experiences in occupied countries. In spite of this amnesia it is essential that we should get at the scientific facts; we must recall our experiences before they escape us entirely. After this war there will be a great demand for observation of psychological phenomena. In my book *Total War and the Human Mind*, I suggested the formation of a kind of international board of diagnosis, which would be capable of scientific observation of phenomena in the international sphere. We psychologists use our eyes and senses differently from the ordinary layman. Now is the time for us to become real field-workers in the service of an international organization.

Personally, I never was more pleased at being a psychologist than during those terrible years of occupation; we had after all the advantage of knowing already what human beings were capable of, and how perverted they might become. That is the reason why we psychologists were better able to accept those terrible circumstances and could more easily defend ourselves from the ill-effects of such knowledge.

Nevertheless, the things I am going to relate may sound too emotional. I hope that I may be forgiven for this, since it must be realized that they have been collected in an unscientific atmosphere. I choose this subject, however, because we have to give our advice and information on this matter every day now, and after the war we shall have to deal with it in a more extended way. However complicated the facts may be, we have to simplify them, for the ordinary layman needs our advice, he cannot cope with such difficult problems by himself.

Why are we all so deeply affected by the idea of treason? Is it only betrayal by our friends which cuts us, or is there an instinctive loathing of treachery in general? Or is it the potential traitor in each of us, the curious problem of self-betrayal which attracts our attention? In wartime especially the whole idea is in the air. Wherever we are inclined to disapprove, we are ready to discover treason. For this reason the whole conception is a question of relative values in so far as the passing of a political or moral judgement is concerned.

II. THE MOOD FOR TREACHERY

No traitor will admit his treachery; in his own mind his conduct is perfectly justifiable. To him, it is his opponents who are the traitors. In the course of practice I have come across several people who later became traitors to their country. One could not have

* Based on a paper read to the British Psychological Society on 1 July 1944, by Major Dr Meerloo of The Hague, Holland, who lived for two years in occupied Holland.

called them wicked; they were rather of the type that is easily influenced by current ideas and theories.

Looking back, it seems to me that those who tried to intimidate me with their Fascism were never strong characters. It was rather those who were disappointed in life, those who were frustrated, and who transferred their feelings of inferiority to political phantoms. Among them were people with serious neurotic abnormalities, some with homosexual tendencies, who had been unable to find any real basis for their lives. There were some who took violent part in the betrayal of their country, who suffered from a strong mother fixation which was projected upon their country. In such instances we have examples of a disloyalty to the family and a disloyalty to the country the seeds of which were sown in youth.

Even the man in the street, incidentally, is vaguely aware of these abnormal fixations. In occupied Holland one found them in the jokes current at the time. There was, for example, the joke about the Dutch Nazi leader who married his aunt, and the one about a similar person who was always striving to keep in the good graces of a tyrannical father.

After the occupation, such people would come triumphantly to me and point out how right they had been. The possession of a new certainty, backed by force, made them hard, and contemptuous of those who had failed. They made great play with the slogans of the conquerors. They were working for the 'New Europe', they declared, though they found it difficult to explain just what this meant. Humanity and righteousness were taboo. Blood must flow for the sake of an ideal. They suddenly took over the Nazi scapegoats, Jewry and Bolshevism, and declared, almost with tears, that the existence of these made inhumanity necessary. They would quote one of the Dutch Nazi leaders (Rost van Tonningen): "The Jews have no culture, and therefore must be got rid of however deplorable this may be." It is, as a matter of fact, characteristic of treachery, that, when the decision to renounce all previous ties has been taken, there is an immediate tendency to find a scapegoat. The traitor finds it impossible completely to argue away his sense of guilt.

The mixture of animal impulse and self-deceit which made up their arguments, combined with their specious friendliness, and desire to make a convert of me, often sickened me. These people with their eternal need for justification, their desire to be led, their private grudges and hatreds, needed above all things to make converts, to persuade other people of the rightness of their attitude. Traitors always try to assuage their conscience by persuading other people of treachery. They fear solitude, the solitude of a man who has done wrong. And it should be remarked that the reformer, the man who is conscious of the essential justice of his cause, does not suffer from a sense of being alone, at least not to the same extent.

Above all, the traitors were men with a grievance, desirous of taking their revenge on society for its ill-treatment of themselves. The desire for revenge is the outward symbol for an inner incapacity, a weakness. It is the religion of the dissatisfied, of those whose ambitions have been frustrated, and the Nazis understood this very well. They systematically sought out such people. There was, for example, the case of the director of a government concern, whom I knew personally. He had never been a member of the Dutch Nazi party, but when he was dismissed from his post on moral grounds, he received the very next day an invitation to join the Nazis and so became some time later

the leader of his guild. Similarly, the chief of another concern, dismissed for embezzlement, returned after a few weeks as a Nazi agent. The armed Dutch Nazi police force, the "Weer Afdeeling", was recruited from among the inmates of an asylum for psychopaths. This the Nazis did in all occupied countries; they chose above all people who were craving for a more primitive and orgiastic satisfaction of their instincts.

The act of treason can sometimes more easily be committed if a change of identification has taken place. Take for instance Lord Haw Haw; he now calls himself a German. He has two burning passions, hatred of Jews and hatred of the capitalists, and these he uses to justify his anti-British attitude. But he is of Irish descent and has as such a hereditary resentment against England. Another traitor (British), a former captain of the Seaforth Highlanders, Baillie Stewart, was bought by the Nazis after he was sentenced to imprisonment for betraying military secrets to a foreign power. This method of selection of the disgruntled is exactly what the Nazis were trying to do in Holland.

Thus the Nazis gave to the weak, the guilty, the ambitious, the frustrated, a camouflage, a set of bogus ideals to which they could transfer their fears, their guilt, their unfulfilled desires. What could not be done by persuasion, however, was done by terror. I know myself how great the temptation was to go over to the enemy, to the strong party, with its powerful organization all ready to persuade you. Its set of slogans and ready-made philosophy comforted the faint-hearted, and if these failed there was the less subtle but equally convincing threat of punishment, which failure to submit involved.

The German propaganda machine is in fact a rather successful instrument for poisoning men's minds. *Mein Kampf* makes frequent references to the method of using human weakness as a starting-point for systematic persuasion. Hitler points out that one must give the disappointed a sense of greatness and importance; once they have achieved this they will swallow every suggestion with the utmost docility. That is why there were so few self-acknowledged traitors in Germany and Italy.

"Promise to relieve the grievance which is dearest to them, and you can then count on the sheeplike docility of the masses; there will be no spur of mental resistance." And indeed, with the Dutch they had at first some success owing to the mental paralysis induced by the suddenness of the invasion, and the complete disruption of a way of life which the people had grown to regard as permanent. Material surrender meant for a short time mental surrender also. There was an uncontrolled projection of old ideals on the new bogus ones. People tried to justify the Germans, to take over their catchwords and their arguments, to identify themselves with a world of ideas which appeared to be stronger than their own. In all human beings there is a tremendous desire to be associated with power. This process lasted only for a very short time, but it was a time with tragic implications. The same thing happened to German thinkers and intellectuals in 1933. Suddenly afraid of life, they surrendered their science, their beliefs, to something which they believed to be stronger than themselves. Just so unstable is our personal structure of truth!

III. THE MAN BENEATH THE TRAITOR

If then we agree that the Nazi method of influencing people works through a systematic and perfidious probing of personal weakness, it becomes clear that if we are to understand a little more the nature of what we are accustomed to call treason we must proceed to a closer study of the individual, his weaknesses and his discontents.

All so-called traitors will swear that their change of attitude emerges from their normal mental development. They insist that they have encountered some things greater than they are, which compel them to make the change. We, on the other hand, would say that their treason is the result of an abnormal and neurotic development, and would not have taken place had they been fully integrated human beings. It certainly cannot be said that a man must remain bounded by the collectivity from which he originally received his feelings and ideas. On the contrary, mental development demands that he shall constantly reassess doctrine, that he shall remain the eternal 'Protestant', facing reality, dogma, and tradition with a critical mind. It is the fate of man that he must go further than his teachers, he must follow his own lights, even where this involves what is sometimes a tragic break, and a lonely progress through the world. At first Socrates was accused of being a traitor and of corrupting youth and of irreligion, because he pursued just such a course. But he refused to escape from prison out of respect for his country's laws. This a traitor never does. He only sees his own rights, never those of the community.

The fact is that what in this war we are accustomed to call treason takes place not on the progressive and intellectual plane but on the instinctual plane. It concerns not the reformation of ideas but the rationalization of uncontrolled instincts. It arises out of feelings, resentment, love, and hate, and it can be traced back to the earliest stages of emotional development. I propose to deal briefly, and necessarily superficially, with this process.

The whole process of growth and development consists of the constant discarding of old worlds and the discovery of new. In the course of this process there are several critical phases, involving major adaptations. A human being who does not succeed in any one of these becomes static, is what we could call a failure in life, yearns for the security of his past, and cannot attain any further security. The most revolutionary phase in our emotional and intellectual life which we experience consciously is that of puberty. In this phase we leave the protection of the family with its own peculiar norms and standards, and try, all unprotected as we are, to make a new life, new standards for ourselves. It is here that our own individuality comes to the fore. The adolescent begins to develop critical powers, putting everything and everybody to the test of his reason, limited though it is, acquiring for himself a body of sacrosanct ideas, and casting doubts on traditional truth. He refuses to accept the rules of society, unless they meet with his approval, and he casts off the world of the past. Thus he might be said to be disloyal to his former surroundings. It is not treachery for him, of course, for in so doing he is true to the self he is beginning to discover, but nevertheless he has a sense of guilt, loneliness and longing. So too the revolutionary, the reformer, who breaks with tradition at the behest of a high power within him. We would not say that Luther betrayed the Church of Rome or Lenin the Czar of Russia. The fact of the matter is that most adolescents after their period of revolt become men who have adjusted themselves to the world as it is, i.e. the traditional world. A few do not adjust themselves. These fall into two groups, shall we say (though two is probably putting it too simply), the one the progressive type which gives rise to the revolutionary, who is guided by a set of principles, which on looking back some time later, we decide are 'good'; the other, the nihilistic and repressive type, produces the traitor who takes his revenge on society by attempting to destroy it, basing his action not on a set of principles

but on hatred and aggression or whatever you like. But is the revolutionary who makes an important contribution to the world not also conditioned by his youthful experiences? Is Hitler to be regarded as a traitor and Lenin as a visionary genius? The psychological answer would surely be that, apart from the details of their individual mental histories, they are much of a muchness; the political answer would, of course, be quite different, and would depend on the point of view of the politician. Indeed, as far as Hitler is concerned he may be said to have betrayed not only his country, but even his own principles and his best friends.

Thus we arrive slowly at a better psychological definition of treachery. It consists in the failure to pay due regard to our inner processes, the denial of our own moral code. Every betrayal is fundamentally a self-betrayal. It is the giving up of one's own sincerity for the sake of power, money, or other form of interest, or under pressure from without. Every time we silence our own conscience for our own benefit or to please others, we are treacherous. Such is treachery and in its most frequent form. Such treachery has deep roots, in the ambivalence of men. In the crisis of puberty, when the adolescent feels himself to be alone, cut off from the familiar world of his childhood, and on the point of stepping into a new, and to him strange world, he hates that which he forsakes, because it seems to have forsaken him. Just as the adolescent hates his parents, so does the traitor hate the leaders he forsakes, and the lover hates the woman he rejects. All the problems of the ambivalent emotions arise from this developing process in early childhood and adolescence. The adolescent has to learn not only to acclimatize himself to a new world but to live in that world with others. It is with difficulty that he learns to outgrow the egocentricity of childhood; the very effort of doing so may leave him in a state of unconscious anger, which may emerge at a later stage, at a time of disappointment and disillusionment. It is perhaps significant that Goebbels, for us the personification of intellectualized and perverted hatred and anti-semitism, had as his most beloved teacher the Jew, Gundolf. The neurotic man who feels his ego has been betrayed becomes the pessimist and cynic who in his turn betrays the adult world, the father image, by his attitude of defeatism. In ancient times already high treason was regarded as aggression against the self, aggression against the King, against the Queen.

This hatred of oneself is not always conscious. In its inverted aspect it appears as a fear of aggressiveness, a fear of repressed and not consciously realized tendencies. Thus we find people who declare that they cannot hate, and who are actually more unwilling to defend their own values than they are to justify the actions of an enemy. Unwittingly they are disloyal to their moral code. The aggressiveness of which they are subconsciously aware inspires them with feelings of guilt, and their sense of inferiority leads them to bow morally to any superior power. Such a masochistic attitude is particularly dangerous at the present time. It seeks perpetually to palliate the bestial behaviour of the enemy. There is something of this in the English attitude. The same fear of hatred and aggressiveness makes such people refuse to accept as the truth stories of suffering and of cruelty told them by their Allies.

A sense of guilt is one of the most fertile sources of betrayal; once an injustice has been done the victim is an object of hatred, and a candidate for further injustice. Thus a vicious circle is set up, in which injustice can only be wiped out by further injustice, betrayal by further betrayal. This explains both the crescendo of criminality in Germany, and the determined treachery of traitors; they simply cannot stop themselves.

It must be added that the decision to betray or not to betray does not always present itself in a clear-cut form, and is in any case not an easy decision to take. But the opportunist who would postpone the decision has already half connected himself with the betrayal. This policy of seduction the Germans understood very well, and they have taken particular pains to make it easy for civil servants in the occupied countries who were in ambiguous positions to sign declarations dissociating themselves in principle from the cause which they were actually espousing. But the conflict remains, and those who are the victims of it fall into a state of moral numbness, which puts them completely at the mercy of the enemy. I have myself heard men who had been compelled to betray their cause in this way confess to a state of complete moral confusion.

IV. HOW TRAITORS ARE NOT MADE

Thus we have to consider two factors with regard to treason, self-betrayal, or inner regression, and betrayal of others, the exploitation of a grudge against the community. Both imply a conflict with the outer world but, whereas betrayal of others may be the result of inner purification, of developed powers of thought, which lead their creator further than his fellows, self-betrayal is bound up with unchecked aggression, repressed patricide, lust of power, and unbridled egoism.

It is essential to understand self-betrayal, the fundamental dissatisfaction with oneself, lest, not having experienced this inner dishonesty ourselves, we are confused in our attitude towards other traitors. After the armistice we shall have to cope with many traitors. Our own feelings of guilt may cause us to forgive them too easily after the war, even to fall into excesses in our punishment of them. However, just as the psychological weakness of a criminal is played upon and provoked by the outer world, just as the hypnotic force of Fascism strengthened the Fascistic tendencies in men, so it may be that mass suggestion towards the good may ultimately neutralize treachery in the traitors. This is an important pedagogical question, a question of mass psychology and mass education. Though the traitors may be punished or ostracized, we know, we cannot escape 'hatchet day'; the horror of the world at their actions is bound to diminish with time, and neither that nor their own sense of guilt is likely to do away with the problems of self-betrayal, and aggression and resentment against man and society.

The spiritual infections which are abroad in the world now will do their work for many years to come. The children of traitors will be in the schools, and those who have betrayed will form new underground movements to propagate Fascism and nihilism. One must take into account the fact that some people can only conquer their sense of inferiority by a persistent attitude of dissatisfaction. Rather than co-operate with others in the community, rather than undertake productive work, they prefer the attractive secrecy of clique and schism, with all the emptiness, the lack of ideals, which the nourishment of private grudges implies. For this reason, whatever is actually done with the traitors, it would be folly to segregate them together. To do so would be to breed a pure culture of hatred and treachery. The atmosphere which prevails in camps for the disaffected is sufficient proof of this. Everybody who has to deal with these camps is conscious of the infectious atmosphere. Although many of the traitors ask for punishment themselves, and many of their leaders have to be punished, we as scientists have to show that just as in the case of common criminals we have to cope with the traitors in a more objective way. The solution of this problem is not only punishment and aggression

against the criminals but a question of environment, of a future world, where it is possible to co-operate with them.

Although it is a dangerous matter in wartime to view the question of treason objectively, I should like in conclusion to offer a few considerations of this nature. From the political point of view treason is the betrayal of a cause in which you believe, by someone who ought to support it, according to your and his common moral code. The conception of treachery, politically speaking, is therefore dependent entirely on the point of view taken.

From the psychological point of view the traitor is a person who feels the need to break away from his environment and even to do violence to it. He feels this need because of a number of reasons, any one of which may be true; the exact reason only analysis of each separate case will reveal, but all are connected with his mental development, particularly that of early childhood and adolescence. The only point at which the psychologist and the politician can meet on this matter is over the question of what to do with the neurotic and destructive traitor, and how to prevent his reappearance. For there is a relationship between the social system and social suggestion and individual behaviour. But all aggressive action, whether fighting, writing books, making a revolution, or burgling, is nurtured and given its individual twist by the personal development of the individual. It is exceedingly dangerous to permit a man to persist in his personal discontent; he too easily becomes blinded to all save his own disappointment and resentment. Reason is of no use to him in that state, for he feels himself innocent and only society to blame. Such people are easily bred, but once bred, difficult to get rid of. It was they who made Fascism, with its 10% justified discontent and 90% hatred of symbols and chimeras. Such hatred is exorcised only by allowing each individual freedom to criticize, and by creating in him a sense of responsibility for his views. The opposition has an important part to play in a democracy, and the democracy that is conscious of its own ideals involves in itself an educative process which will be able to eradicate psychological unbalance in the future.

The lesson from this study is that we have to make plain our psychological attitude and approach to the problem of treason. Our experiences of individual psychology have to be aligned with our sociological knowledge. We have to choose neither the emotional standpoint nor the political standpoint, nor the individual standpoint. But we have to use our socio-psychological knowledge which postulates a dynamic interrelationship between the community and the individual, between the social system and the behaviour that can be expected of men.

Fascism and Nazism sought to build only on the weakness of men, not on their good qualities, on the factors of men's minds that make for lack of balance, not on those which make for a co-ordinated person, group or state. We know now to what disastrous results such a policy can lead. Not until we cease to exploit discontent and self-betrayal for political aims can we hope to create a well-integrated society.

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THE BRITISH SOLDIER: CHANGING ATTITUDES AND IDEAS

By TOM HARRISSON

I. *Introduction* (p. 34). II. *Regular and militiaman* (pp. 34-35). III. *Morale and outlets* (pp. 35-36). IV. *Liberal ideas and leadership* (p. 36). V. *Psychologists in the army* (pp. 36-37). VI. *Discipline* (p. 37). VII. *Routines* (pp. 37-38). VIII. *Horizons* (pp. 38-39).

I. INTRODUCTION

Guardsman, Gunner, Trooper, Sapper, Driver, Private, Rifleman, Craftsman—these are only unit names for the common soldier of Britain's army, a man with a basic pay rate of 3s. a day. These millions of khakied citizens run the whole gamut of traditional military gradation—from the senior British regiment, the Life Guards, peacetime spectacle of shiny armour and flowing plumes in Whitehall, now armoured in the full, 1943 sense, through to newer arms, the Army Education Corps (its badge an open book); the Army Dental Corps (discreetly, it does not show its teeth); and newest, wartime ones, the Intelligence Corps with its 'rose and crown' badge; the Army Catering Corps, which has so much improved messing; the unobtrusive, invaluable Pioneers; Airborne, with claret berets; and the brown-bereted Reconnaissance Corps, known as 'Recce' (to these last, incidentally, the present writer belongs). It is no more possible to generalize the 'characteristics' of the British soldier than of the Briton, and the two do not differ. All types serve.

Unless one appreciates the kaleidoscope of this army, grown from age-long roots and complex loyalties, modified by new urgencies of modern war, the contemporary pattern cannot be fully understood. Traditions are on the move since the small peacetime groupings have been practically submerged by civilians in uniform, huge new formations; notably the Royal Armoured Corps have combined many famous old regiments, such as the Cavalry (Lancers, Hussars, Dragoons). The painful fusion of the spirit of our fighting past and the necessity of war's harsh armament runs right through the present army.

II. REGULAR AND MILITIAMAN

The peacetime soldier joined up (often because unable to obtain work in an economic depression) and made soldiering a job of work, without much thought of actual fighting. We barely considered war until 1938. Many signed on again when their term was up. They had got into the army habit, even if they didn't like it.

There were some simple, dominating ideas in the regular's ethic. These ideas—inferiority feeling, negative interests, selfishness, ritualism—grew naturally out of 1930 conditions. They had advantages, as well as serious disadvantages. They have only gradually been modified, the constructive aspects developed at the expense of the negative, destructive factors which handicapped 1939-40 service psychology. The army of Libya, Tunisia, Syria, Sicily and places north, had to cut off much of the older foliage, while retaining the very real strength of the old, firm roots. The regular was not always the cream of British manhood, but he made the nucleus of the new army, around

which hundreds of thousands of plumbers, joiners and journalists, engineers and architects, undertakers, unemployed, errand boys, clustered into the formations of El Alamein, Catania, Salerno. The 1940 call-up's outlook was quite different. It came in for battle, not for a living. In our army, some of the main motives which keep the civilian working and happy, don't apply. There is no security, even of life. There is little financial incentive—I netted 19s. a week after 18 months' service. Most naturally want to be back in 'civvy street' as soon as they decently can. So the driving impulse towards efficiency is to fight the war and get it over. There is an underlying impatience, set going by incidents which, in civilian life, would seem quite small symptoms of a familiar system, and which could probably be avoided, anyway ignored. That is why the most frequent complaints of the temporary soldier is—and always will be—feeling 'browned off'.

Whereas the regular may have lived for months doing nothing very relevant to battle, now anything apparently irrelevant to the job in hand is liable to annoy. He only does eagerly those things which seem necessary to make him an efficient war-winning unit. Anything else is liable to seem a further unnecessary infringement of rights he has readily given up by joining the services. That is why we have had a fuss about blancing equipment and polishing brasses. These things are trivial enough in themselves but, like fatigues which appear simply a way of filling in time, petty punishments of minor offences and errors, or anything else superficially irrelevant to war, such trivia set in motion that mixture of cynicism and subterranean anger which makes for becoming 'browned off'.

III. MORALE AND OUTLETS

We started this war with insufficient forethought. This applied equally to tactics and to training, to weapons and to the basis of battle, the human material which alone can be trained to use, shoot, deploy and win. Little thought had been taken for the human side, 'the soldier's soul'. We embarked upon the most comprehensive conscription in history without any new approach. Very voluntary-minded citizens were at first expected to fall into the familiar 1914-39 pattern. But not only was this conscription bigger, swifter, more dislocating than any before. Compared with their 1914 fathers, these men were more educated, more aware as citizens, more politically minded, trade-union organized, and sceptical of propaganda; also more doubtful of war's contribution to civilization.

There was a time, accentuated by Dunkirk but continuing into 1941, when the consequent psychological conflicts were having a very appreciable effect on army efficiency.* Morale was good but seldom good enough. To win the war the very best was needed from every citizen, serviceman or civilian.

In the last two years there has been a big change in the army handling of morale. There is a new War Office and officer approach to soldier morale. The soldier is now regarded as including a heart; a charge upon the conscience of his officers. This has, of course, been recognized before. But the absence of clear-cut definition is indicated by the poverty of relevant literature. A turning point was the publication in July 1940 of *The Fighting Soldier*, by Major W. A. S. Dunlop, with a foreword by General Ironside. In June 1942 a more mature pamphlet *Comrades in Arms*, prepared under the auspices of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, stated explicitly the 'officer-men relationship',

* As I well know, being then a civilian running a morale research organization, Mass-Observation, for government departments.

and set the seal of approval on the fullest *human* associations in place of the formal. A typical paragraph, which then still seemed almost revolutionary in its wording, though taken for granted in army thinking now:

At the beginning of the war, when the men called up were all young, this question of politics was not important; nearly all of them were far too young to have any special political leaning. But it is now a different matter. The army is getting older men who have been possibly keen trade unionists with strong political views as well; very often they will come into the army suspicious and resentful of its authority, and it will be necessary to understand their point of view and to make the necessary allowances.

Three years ago the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (A.B.C.A.) was started under W. F. Williams (previously head of the Workers' Educational Association). The idea of holding weekly discussions on a platoon basis—the men arguing with officers and N.C.O.'s about topical matters—then seemed shocking to many older soldiers. A.B.C.A.'s weekly discussion pamphlets, *War and Current Affairs*, are now universally accepted, and admit the place of democratic discussion inside army life. The recent introduction of weekly 'Request Hours', in which any man can see his Company Commander informally, without being marched in at attention by the Sergeant Major, marks another step in the same direction. In 1943 you can make complaints which in 1940 laid you open to the serious possibility of being 'put on a charge' for that all-embracing army crime, 'frivolous complaint'.

IV. LIBERAL IDEAS AND LEADERSHIP

Most present officers, especially those who deal directly with the troops, have come into the army since the war. They have basically the same attitude as their men, already described. It tends, however, to be stronger, because the officer has more education, and very often, as a young man of the pre-war years, has views about the world which combine wide doubts with a 'left-wing' streak. This has made for a closer appreciation of the human facts and feelings underlying the necessary forms of discipline, punishment, drill, discomfort. Among the senior officers, too, rapid promotion has brought many liberalizing influences.

Along with this has gone internal criticism of military habits, elimination of the unnecessary, accelerated growth of new ideas. The British way of combining old and new, changing for the better while leaving what is good in the old, is reflected in the wartime story of drill. The old barrack-square drill, based on the days before musketry, persists as the recognized basis for teaching 'initial co-operation', 'uncritical obedience', 'self-control', 'confidence in weapons', etc. I averaged 30 min. a day 'square bashing' and enjoyed it, even if my feet didn't. At the same time, another new drill, Battle Drill, has come to fill a prime place in training. Here the emphases are opposite—'fire and movement', infiltration, camouflage, speed, sub-unit initiative, N.C.O. and individual decision, self-critical co-operation. Battle Drill, with its associates, Battle School, Battle Inoculation (live ammunition), Assault Courses, have had a big effect.

V. PSYCHOLOGISTS IN THE ARMY

Back in 1941, when there were allegations of wasted man-power in the services, the Ministry of Labour set up a committee under Sir William Beveridge. Largely as a result of their report, extensive measures were taken to fit the men to the work—the previous army theory left it up to the man to fit the job, or else...

A new system of sifting recruits was instituted in 1942. Every man entering the army went to the General Service Corps for six weeks' primary training, a rigorous initiation of drill, doubling, physical training, basic weapons, getting fit, obedient and alert. The old unit competition was over, and so was the slap-dash allocation of men from meagre call-up papers. At the G.S.C. each man was psychologically tested. He was then sent to the most suitable unit, and earmarked for a specific job there. A man marked as an officer type would presently get a chance to go before more psychologists at a War Office Selection Board.

It is considered on the whole that the results of this system have fully justified an experiment that at first caused amazement, even ridicule, in many quarters. The change contributed much to morale and efficiency. It introduced an intelligent, intelligible system, making men feel valued for their private abilities and personal peculiarities.

VI. DISCIPLINE

A unit's life revolves around its discipline, that is, co-operation, co-ordination, common purpose, and sundry failings in these. The attitude to discipline has also been liberalized, though it has remained one of the less changed aspects of army life. The shadow of Detention Barracks, 'Glasshouse' (which can only be awarded by senior officers), falls noticeably heavy across the soldier's mind. It is not that most men expect to get detention. But it seems much closer than prison in 'civvy street'. No self-respecting 'civvy' need expect to be 'punished' for 'crime'. The soldier who can serve a year without being 'crimed' must be cunning or dull. The offence may be late in on Saturday night, 12.15 p.m. instead of midnight; a dirty belt on inspection; hair too long for Church parade. For these things, a Company Commander can give up to 7 days C.B. (confined to barracks), a C.O. up to 14 days. This lesser punishment is seldom unpleasant. It is the psychology at the back of it that counts with the temporary soldier, valuing his independence and respectability. Punishments encourage what I call 'the middle-rank psychology', keeping in the background, not showing up or becoming conspicuous. When a Corporal asks for volunteers, it is assumed that he will go on, "You, you, and you—volunteers". A chronic army joke is some variation on this theme, e.g.

Sergeant: "Can anyone here ride a bicycle?"

Private: "Yes, Serg., I can."

Sergeant: "All right. Go on down to the stores and mend the puncture in mine."

VII. ROUTINES

Soldiers live in crowded comradeship, mostly 25-30 to a room, with shared lockers, straw palliasses, three blankets each (plus one in winter), a table and two benches per room. 'Lights out' is at 10.30 or 10.45 p.m. Reveille comes up at 6 a.m. The first morning job is to clean the room, make bed, lay kit—webbing, equipment, P.T. shoes, second suit of serge battle-dress, steel helmet with camouflage net fitted, bayonet, respirator, pack. A soldier has also a working suit of canvas denims, two extra shirts as well as the one he's wearing, an alternative pair of underclothes (woollen in winter, aertex in summer), three pairs of socks (woollen all year), two sets of P.T. kit, one cap. It is not so easy for a British soldier to look smart with his small wardrobe; yet he usually manages.

The normal day's work runs till 6 or 7 p.m. but may end earlier or go on continuously for weeks. Meals are generally breakfast, lunch (main meal), a high tea around 5.30 p.m., and snack supper most nights. There is plenty of food and its quality has greatly improved. But most men eat extra food in N.A.A.F.I. or other canteens. A man's out-of-hours activities are curtailed only by the necessity of 'signing out' and into camp, and keeping within bounds (generally a 5-10 miles radius).

Extensive efforts are now made to provide camp entertainments. The Unit Entertainment Officer books regular film shows. E.N.S.A., run through the Ministry of Labour, provides concert parties and dance bands. C.E.M.A. sends musicians and plays, which attract an increasing audience. Sport is organized by the P.R.T. (President of the Regimental Institute), but most men prefer to relax physically in their small spare time. Sunday is seldom completely free, and in static units there is often compulsory Church parade, undoubtedly increasing many soldiers' pre-war disillusion about the Church of England. The padre is respected but inconspicuous. Library facilities are seldom as good as they could be. Among newspapers only the sensational, leftish, pictorial *Daily Mirror* is influential. Radio mainly depends on individually owned sets, with Bob Hope and Bing Crosby as favourites; the English girl, Vera Lynn, is the 'Forces' sweetheart' for her sentimental crooning of fox-trot lyrics. Among 'pin up' girls, Betty Grable, Lana Turner and Lucille Ball lead; no British female gets a place—excepting of course the wife or girl friend.

Separations provide the strongest strain, and the linking letter is eagerly awaited, causing furious annoyance if delayed. The war has strengthened many old marriages, and accelerated new ones. But where separations are stretched too far, husbands are serving abroad, surplus soldiers are around the home, trouble arises. Many matrimonial complications await the return of victorious armies.

VIII. HORIZONS

Leave, magic army word, is the real leisure outlet. The leave roster is punctiliously observed whenever serving conditions permit, to the extent of a week's leave (plus time allowed for long journeys) every 3 months, and 48 hours every 6 weeks. Leave conditions army thinking. The trajectory of thought of all ranks is 3 months. The horizon of years is obscured by the index of a week's peace, privacy, out of uniform, lying in bed, saluting nobody, forgetting to do up a button. This week reaffirms the existence of 'civvy street', fortifies for another 3 months' hard work, is a refresher of service and promise of peace ahead.

As the war goes on, and as the end begins to seem in sight, the traditional, largely inevitable impatience of the soldier begins to have more important effects on his personal outlook. A Mass-Observation investigator showed that soldiers have much less faith in the powers of any existing political party to 'get things right' after the war, than did the civilian population. Parallel with political disillusion run fears about the insecurity of the post-war world. There are conflicting motifs running through service ideas about the post-war world. The comforts of 'civvy street' assume an exaggerated value; home and civilian life seem like some dream oasis of peace and rest, holding for many virtues which they probably never possessed in peacetime. In the mental background is the hope, though not necessarily the belief, that the end of the war will mean a return to

this idealized personal peace. Cross-cutting the dream of security and personal freedom are factual doubts about post-war opportunities. As the war goes on, fear grows, especially among the young, that they will have been out of 'civvy street' too long to pick up where they left off. As one private put it:

There's the fear of the war lasting so long that the years of my youth will be past when it's over. Twenty-five now, I might be thirty when it's over, and at thirty one is getting too old for a good many activities, I suppose.

In 1942 the soldier's attitude towards the post-war world was considerably more impersonal than this. The impersonal is giving way to the personal. 'This nagging uncertainty is the most disturbing of all', said an Infantry O.C.T.U. candidate of his post-war prospects. And a private of twenty-five who was studying architecture before the war said:

I am afraid that the old members will be in reserved jobs and will have all the best positions after the war, and thus nullify the new thought which was making itself patent in architecture in this country in the thirties.

As one soldier put it:

Like 99% of all the forces I am only awaiting the armistice in order to claim an immediate discharge. However, I realize this is foolish.

Here is the major military problem of a victory wrung from the willing hands and lives of millions of citizens in Britain, as in the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China too.

(Manuscript received 26 February 1944)

SCORES OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF NEUROTICS ON TESTS OF INTELLIGENCE

By PATRICK SLATER

I. *Introduction* (p. 40). II. *Description and results of inquiry* (pp. 40-41). III. *Discussion* (pp. 41-42).
References (p. 42).

I. INTRODUCTION

It is generally agreed that neurotics as a whole are not abnormal as regards intelligence; some may be abnormally dull, others abnormally bright, but on the average normal men have no appreciable advantage over neurotics or vice versa. It is also generally agreed that neuroses of different types tend to occur among persons of different orders of intelligence: in particular, obsessional neuroses among highly intelligent persons and hysterias among backward. Most of the evidence on which these generalizations rest is clinical, and may be advantageously confirmed with scientific tests.

II. DESCRIPTION AND RESULTS OF INQUIRY

Data for such a test were collected about men admitted to the neurological wards at Sutton Emergency Hospital. The majority of them suffered from neuroses of mixed types in which hysterical or depressive symptoms and anxiety states predominated; obsessional cases were comparatively rare. A general description has been given by E. Slater(1). It was found convenient to draw as many as possible of the cases of obsession on the records, and add equal numbers of cases of other types, so as to provide four groups of equal numbers: Obsessional neuroses, Miscellaneous neuroses, Anxiety states, and Hysterias. After each obsessional case was drawn, the next case on the records was entered as miscellaneous, and thereafter the next Anxiety state and Hysteria were taken. The records cover a period of over two years, during which many psychological tests were used, but the main ones were Progressive Matrices(2), Cattell IIA and IIB(3) and the Shipley Vocabulary Test(4). The men who did Cattell IIA also did Cattell IIB as part of an investigation reported elsewhere(5). Scores of 25 men of each type on each variety of test were obtained. Their averages and standard deviations are shown in Table 1.

Table 1

	Average	Standard deviation
A. Progressive Matrices		
Obsessions	44.44	9.005
Miscellaneous neuroses	36.08	10.712
Anxiety states	37.92	9.018
Hysterias	38.16	9.195
B. Cattell IIA and IIB (total)		
Obsessions	191.2	40.344
Miscellaneous neuroses	168.0	38.079
Anxiety states	170.8	26.445
Hysterias	169.6	33.352
C. Shipley Vocabulary		
Obsessions	28.72	7.706
Miscellaneous neuroses	22.96	10.089
Anxiety states	22.84	8.711
Hysterias	24.84	8.133

A compact test of significance can be made after all scores have been reduced to standard measure. Sums of scores were divided by the mean standard deviation within groups of all groups doing the same test, and sums of squares of scores by the mean square variance within groups. This left a set of figures which can be analysed as shown in Table 2.

Table 2

Source of variance	Sum of squares	Degrees of freedom	Mean square
Total variance of standardized test scores	547.2042	299	—
Variance due to differences between tests	233.3965	2	—
Variance due to difference between obsessionals and others	23.9502	1	23.95 (a)
Variance due to remaining differences between types of neurotics	0.9639	2	0.4820 (b)
Variance due to interaction between type of diagnosis and test used	0.8936	6	0.1489 (c)
Variance within groups (error)	288.0000	288	1.0000

(a) $F=23.950$, $P<0.01$. (b) $F=2.033$, $P>0.05$. (c) $F=6.716$, $P<0.05>0.01$.

The variance due to differences between tests is of no immediate interest; it merely indicates that the ratio of mean to standard deviation differs. It is recorded because it needs to be excluded from the error variance.

The only source of variance which provides a mean square significantly in excess of the residual is the difference between obsessional and other types of neurosis (a). As a group, the obsessionals are distinctly more intelligent than the others; the others do not differ significantly among themselves (b).

The variance due to interaction is significantly less than its error; this is also a finding of no immediate interest. It indicates the presence of correlation between the three tests.

A supplementary analysis was made of the ages of these patients. It is given in Table 3; and shows that the groups do not differ significantly. The average age of the patients was 28 years 8 months.

Table 3

Source of variance	Sum of squares	Degrees of freedom	Mean square
Total variance in age (years)	11234.621	299	—
Variance between groups	58.089	3	19.363 (a)
Variance within groups (error)	11176.532	296	37.759

(a) $F=1.950$, $P>0.05$.

III. DISCUSSION

The results are sufficient to demonstrate that men suffering from obsessional neuroses tend to be more intelligent than those suffering from other neuroses, but not sufficient to prove that other types of neurotics differ amongst themselves in intelligence. In more general terms, they demonstrate that neurotics are heterogeneous as regards intelligence.

In developing a general theory of neurosis this is an important fact to take into consideration. There are many characteristics which are common to different classes of neurotics, such as poor family history, poor personal history and poor work record. In any analysis of the incidence of such characteristics, a general factor is likely to be found which may be described as a neurosis factor. This has already been done (cf. (1)).

In earlier controversies about the nature of general intelligence, Prof. Godfrey Thomson showed that phenomena which can be accounted for by the hypothesis of a single common factor can also be accounted for by the hypothesis of overlapping group

factors. The same alternatives are open to consideration concerning the nature of neurosis; and any choice between the two is likely to be influenced to some extent by ulterior purposes, i.e. by convenience for working.

But observations concerning heterogeneity are of critical value in directing a choice between these two hypotheses. If there is a single general factor of neurosis, men selected for admission to hospital as neurotics can be regarded as selected for possession of a common characteristic. They should therefore be more homogeneous in other related characteristics than the population from which they are drawn.

On the other hand, if there are many factors which facilitate the occurrence of a neurosis, and if they can sometimes reinforce one another, we shall expect to find many common characteristics which differentiate neurotics from normal men, and yet find, when we isolate a particular characteristic, that neurotics are heterogeneous in its respect.

The implications of a theory of overlapping group factors facilitating neuroses and the general evidence in its favour has been discussed more fully in another paper⁽⁶⁾; but specific evidence needs to be adduced from a large number of sources, of which this is intended to be one.

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(*Manuscript received 18 March 1944*)

OBITUARY

PROFESSOR G. F. STOUT, 1860-1944

We announce with great regret the death of Professor G. F. Stout, formerly Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of St Andrews. A full obituary notice will be published in the next number of this *Journal*.

PUBLICATIONS RECENTLY RECEIVED

The Statistical Study of Literary Vocabulary. By G. UDNY YULE. Cambridge University Press. 1944. Pp. x+306. 25s. net.

Nothing can be definitely proved by statistics but Mr Yule has provided convincing statistical evidence that the work *De Imitatione Christi* was written by Thomas à Kempis and not by Gerson, to whom many have wished to attribute it. Strictly speaking the above statement should be amended, for if there appeared a hitherto unknown claimant for authorship whose vocabulary (in Mr Yule's sense of the word, meaning the number of words *used* by the author) closely resembled that of Thomas à Kempis, then it would not be possible by the methods described in this book to settle the rival claims in any way. We may say, therefore, that Mr Yule has demonstrated the unlikeliness of Gerson having written the *Imitatio* and the strong probability of its having been written by Thomas à Kempis or by some unknown author with a similar vocabulary.

The methods described in this book are novel and interesting: they are also exceedingly laborious. Confining himself largely to nouns, Mr Yule has counted and drawn up frequency distribution tables of the occurrences of nouns in the works of various authors, listing those nouns which occur only once, those which occur twice and so on, up to, in the case of the *Imitatio*, a noun which occurs 418 times in a sample of 8225 occurrences. From these frequency distribution tables are derived in the ordinary way the mean number of occurrences of a noun and the standard deviation about that mean. These measures vary from author to author but their values also vary in a single author according to the size of the samples considered. Mr Yule therefore sought for a 'characteristic' of a vocabulary which should be independent of the number of occurrences on which any frequency distribution table is based. Now it was found that the form of noun distributions closely resembles that of accident distributions, with the difference that whilst the number of persons at risk who have no accidents in a given period is usually known, the number of nouns *not* used by an author cannot be estimated. Working on the analogy of the statistical theory of accidents, with which his name has been associated for many years, Mr Yule found that such a 'characteristic' was yielded by a simple formula. If S_1 and S_2 are the first and second moments of a frequency distribution of nouns about zero as origin, then the characteristic K is given by the expression $K = (S_2 - S_1)/S_1^2$. This characteristic varies greatly from author to author but is not absolutely constant for any one author, being affected by the heterogeneity of the material in the samples examined.

The problem of sampling in this field is a difficult one and Mr Yule gives exhaustive details of the many pitfalls in the way and methods for their avoidance. For trustworthy results a sample of some 2000 occurrences of a noun, implying a sample of about 10,000 words, is recommended. Other methods of comparing authors, as, for instance, by their use of Old English-Teutonic or Latin-Romance nouns, or by the correlations between occurrences of nouns in different samples of an author's work, are described in detail; in fact the reader is hard put to it to imagine any method of comparison which Mr Yule has not tried and worked out with complete thoroughness. The labour involved is patently terrific, and the reader is filled with admiration both for Mr Yule's tremendous industry, and for his clear-sighted caution in interpreting his results.

Psychologists will be interested in certain passages dealing with memory for words. Mr Yule states (2.20): "The facts shown by the preceding tables throw a good deal of light on the difficulty of acquiring the vocabulary of a new language simply by reading a book in that language; for it is clear that relatively few words out of the whole vocabulary are repeated sufficiently often to enforce their meaning on the memory." Later (4.14) he says: "It is, I think, true that every word one has ever read is in some sense stored in the mind; if one says one cannot *remember* the word for this or the other, one usually means no more than that one cannot at the moment *recall* it"; and also (4.16): "...the writer's treasure chest may be pictured as containing, beneath the top layer of words in daily and hourly use, lower layers of less frequently but still fairly frequently used words, words also fairly readily at call and in numbers greatly exceeding those in daily use. Below these again will be layers of words in still less frequent use, and more difficult of recall, but amounting in all to a still larger total. And right at the bottom of the chest there will be layer on dusty layer, but rarely disturbed, of words very infrequently used and very hard to recall." This contrast between *recognition* and voluntary *recall* is an important one and must have very marked effects on a writer's vocabulary as judged by his written words. It is probably true to say that any well-read man rarely encounters a word (apart from highly technical terms) with the meaning of which he is unfamiliar. From the point of view of reading, therefore, the vocabulary of educated people is exceedingly large, as Mr Yule points out, but the matter is different when we consider the voluntary recall and production of words for writing or speaking. Here verbal intelligence and verbal memory, fluency, love of words for their own sake, personal idiosyncrasies of preference for euphony and for the poly- or monosyllabic, and so on, all come in and play a part in determining the number and type of words used, and there are great personal differences in all these factors. From one point of view, therefore, educated people will tend to have approximately equal

vocabularies, within fairly wide limits, but the number of "words at risk" for voluntary recall when writing will vary enormously from person to person.

Bearing this in mind, one may perhaps disagree with Mr Yule's conception of "richness of vocabulary". He writes (5.2): "Suppose we are comparing two authors whose words at risk (the total words in their treasure-chests) are respectively W_1 and W_2 . The only definite meaning I find it possible to attach to such a phrase as 'the relative richness of the vocabulary of the second author compared with that of the first' is the ratio W_2/W_1 ." Now if we are correct in the foregoing remarks, this ratio will tend to be unity for well-read authors, so that "richness of vocabulary" in Mr Yule's sense would be a relatively meaningless attribute. Surely a conception of richness of vocabulary, to have meaning, would have to be based on words actually used and not on "words at risk"? Mr Yule decries the impressionistic judgement of richness of vocabulary obtained by merely reading and says that "the basis of the impressionistic judgement is obscure". One may suggest that this basis may be that the reader gives the author the credit of knowing all the commoner and most frequently occurring words and reads them without any special attention, his interest being caught by the rare and infrequent words, so that the more of the latter there appear in an author's works the richer is his vocabulary thought to be by the reader. Mr Yule provides implicit evidence for this view when he writes (6.22): "Of the two streams that contribute to Bunyan's vocabulary, the main stream of biblical words and the tributary of his native dialect, it is remarkable how much the latter, in spite of its far smaller bulk, contributes to the colour and flavour of the text." However, one would hazard the opinion that questions of "richness", "flavour" and finally literary style are beyond the scope of studies dealing solely with nouns or even with all parts of speech and depend in the last instance on such matters as meaning, rhythm and euphony, which are scarcely amenable to statistical treatment.

The ordinary reader will find this book a very long one, although it contains much of general interest even to a reader with scanty mathematics. To the research worker in this field the volume will almost certainly be a classic text-book: the record of Mr Yule's labours and experiences will enable him to avoid many traps and obstacles and to explore fresh territory confidently under expert guidance. Mr Yule's writing is unfailingly clear and lucid and he enlivens what might have been dull subject-matter in some hands with many flashes of humour.

The printing and the lay-out of the book reach that high standard of excellence which is always expected and obtained from the Cambridge University Press.

E. G. C.

Principles of Systematic Psychology. By COLEMAN R. GRIFFITH. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press. 1943. Pp. xv+718. \$4.50 net.

It would be useless to pretend that an adequate review of Professor Griffith's book can be published at the present time in this *Journal*. Coming at any time the book would be heartening, not alone for its size, which is impressive, but for its devoted preoccupation with every type of fundamental psychological problem, its leisurely and learned pursuit of solutions, and for the sustained judgement and wide knowledge of the author. Coming at the present time the volume may appear very much cut off from events and to require for its reading a steadiness of mind and persistence of purpose hard to have. Whether it is read now or put on one side for more complete study, it is very much to be hoped that the volume will be acquired and at some time most seriously pondered by a large circle of psychological students.

The outlook throughout is consistently functional, and empirical. Whatever type of material is being considered—whether "forms of stimuli" leading to problems of sensation, perception, recall and the higher mental processes, or "challenging situations", leading to the whole psychology of learning—it has its place only as material whose context and interplay produce determined aspects of human behaviour. The description of the material is a necessary preliminary, and this gives a legitimate place for introspective psychology, but description, in the manner thus achieved, does not "contribute major elements to the system of psychology". Identification of psychological functions and of their organization are even more important, but these, too, must be considered as affecting "a field of possible operations in such a way that typical products ensue". Material, functions, operations and products all have to be studied in the light of their significance in relation to "the fitness of the organism—in its context".

Here difficulty is likely to arise for many readers, because context must not be taken as having any particular relation to a social setting. Professor Griffith rather strenuously denies that what he calls communal living produces any problem that is uniquely psychological. All that he actually declares is that "there are no operational techniques by which the psychic qualities of institutions, ideologies, or cultures can either be affirmed or denied". This he does appear to take to mean that there can be no place for social psychology in systematic psychology. The man who constitutes the psychologist's problems is not "spiritual, rational, empirical, romantic, economic, political, biological, oriental, western" (for these are all fictional creatures), but just "human". Yet since the psychologist must study how the essential human functions, in their traffic with every kind of environment, lead to workable behaviour, he has not only to look at but even to "take sides on economic, political and moral questions". If he is primarily concerned with such contexts he will be an applied psychologist, working in a field of human engineering, but this needs its preface of pure science, dealing with the dynamic and functional general laws of nature.

Any brief summary must be inadequate and misleading, and do injustice to the skill of the argument, the extent of its range, and the genuine learning by which it is inspired. Even if the reader is not much attracted by systematic problems, he will find a mass of accurate and critical statement about very nearly every important movement in psychological technique and theory that has achieved any forceful expression. The book is a genuine constructive and critical effort in the grand style, and although many more words are used than are necessary and much of the terminology may appear out of the way and over-elaborate, nevertheless it is a notable achievement and worthy of very high praise.

The Nature and Treatment of Mental Disorders. By T. V. MOORE. Foreword by EDWARD A. STRECKER. New York: Greene and Stratton. 1943. Pp. viii + 312. \$4.00.

Prof. T. V. Moore needs no introduction to English readers. His work has always been distinguished for its fine blend of insight and caution. He is widely known and respected as an investigator who remains loyal to the claims of exact method while sacrificing none of his lively interest in the day-to-day behaviour of men.

This book will add to his reputation. In Part I, *Psychopathology*, fundamental ideas concerning the nature, determination and classification of mental illness are considered. In Part II, *Therapy by Psychological Analysis*, the basic methods of free association and dream analysis are described and criticized. In Part III, *Miscellaneous Techniques*, other special methods of treatment are discussed and illustrated in eight chapters. In Part IV, *Organic Emotional Disorders*, there are a most attractive consideration of the physiology of the emotions, and a rather too brief study of the now rapidly expanding types of pharmacological treatment. A most valuable appendix defines or describes the chief "clinical entities" of psychiatry.

Prof. Moore begins in a singularly interesting manner by taking the main kinds of mental disorder and presenting a very clear summary of their quantitative differences in terms of basic reactions, in so far as these differences are claimed to have been established by statistical analysis. It is a pity that he does not discuss at all the assumptions which have to be made by such analysis or the extent to which they are justified. But the impression that one gets is that a serious attempt is going to be made to build something of the nature of a clinical science of mental disorder which will link very fundamental, constituent reactions firmly with the complete clinical picture. This impression is strengthened by his following criticisms of Freud, Jung, Adler and others. He truly says of Freud, for example: "One who has had only a little training in the technique of testing conjectures by statistical procedures will be surprised again and again by the utter lack of any attempt on Freud's part to work out any kind of a coefficient of association, much less to look for irrelevant factors should any such association be found." The same type of criticism is repeated several times, though always with a judicious appreciation of the work of the author who is criticized.

It is therefore slightly disappointing to find that when Prof. Moore pursues his discussion of miscellaneous techniques he also lays the chief emphasis upon the interpretation, by experience and judgement, of the case history. This he does with great clarity and skill, but all the same it is a pity to find that the promise of a sustained attempt to lay down the foundations of a clinical science of psychiatry has largely, though not completely, disappeared into another illustration of the exploits and possibilities of clinical art.

For all this the book is a valuable one, both for the student and for the practitioner, and deserves wide attention.

Language and Thought in Schizophrenia. Collected Papers. Edited by J. S. KASANIN. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press (Cambridge University Press). 1944. Pp. xiv + 133. \$2.00.

This book consists of a series of papers by different authors presented at a meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, brought up to date and edited with comments and concluding remarks by Dr Kasanin. Several of the most interesting papers, notably the very able one by Goldstein, are based on an experimental approach to the thought and language of the schizophrenic, and are particularly valuable from the methodological point of view, indicating how useful the experimental approach can be in arriving at an understanding of the nature of the disorder, as well as for diagnosis and prognosis. Goldstein, using the methods he employed with cases of cortical lesion, and Kasanin, working with the method adopted from Ach by Vigotsky, used non-verbal experimental material; and it is interesting to compare their results with those of Cameron and Benjamin, using verbal techniques, and Beck, using the Rorschach method.

The main result emphasized is the schizophrenic's loss of the power of generalization or the use of abstract categories, as against immediate reaction to concrete and sensory aspects. He cannot maintain a single 'universe of discourse', nor discriminate between one and another (Angyal is particularly illuminating on this point). The boundary disappears between 'figure' and 'ground', between the ego and the outside world, between 'reality' and 'phantasy'. At the same time, he has little interest in maintaining social contact with people in the outside world; hence the egocentric tendency of his thought

flows into his language and is not corrected by the need for communication. He remains bound within an egocentric world, unrelated to reality thinking, resembling the Freudian 'unconscious'.

Dr Kasanin puts forward some interesting speculations as to the origin of these tendencies in the pre-schizophrenic child's lack of security, his unsureness of himself and his ambivalence, which discourage him from trying out his ideas of reality and from coming to any definite conclusions as to their correctness or otherwise. Thus perhaps he never learns to differentiate with any assurance between what is true and what is false, what real and what unreal. These are valuable suggestions; and it is to be hoped that the authors of these papers may be able to pursue them a stage further by actual study of pre-psychotic cases.

Gauging Public Opinion. By HADLEY CANTRIL and Research Associates in the Office of Public Opinion Research, Princeton University. Princeton University Press. 1944. Pp. xiv + 318. \$3.75.

This book makes it clear that public opinion research has reached a stage where its scientific claims cannot be denied consideration. In it Hadley Cantril and his associates describe and discuss all the most important problems which face users of the polling technique. Repeated analysis of old material and new experiments provide a basis for evaluating the popular criticisms of the method and comparing the relative merits of the most important means of overcoming the difficulties discussed. The sections of the book which deal with the framing of questions and interviewing are the most thorough. Experiments are reported showing the merits and demerits of various forms of question, which should be of the greatest value to all concerned with the production of questionnaires. The experiments on interviewing bring out some surprising facts. Individual training of interviewers does not make much difference to their efficiency, but the responses of coloured Americans to white and coloured interviewers are very different. Interviewers' opinions affect the replies they get, but not to a numerically important extent so long as the interviewers are of varied opinion. The section on sampling is chiefly concerned with an estimate of the adequacy of the sampling methods customarily used by the polls, which are concluded to be sufficiently accurate for their purpose. A very interesting part of the book deals with motivation and the factors determining opinion. Unfortunately there is no reference to the more qualitative methods of investigating these things, which are probably more successful. This limitation is a self-imposed one and has good reason, but it tends to put the methods discussed in a false perspective. In this section Cantril states seventeen laws of public opinion deduced from his experience of opinion trends in the last few years.

Many of the problems discussed in this book are similar to those experienced by psychologists in investigations of individual attitudes. But the solutions differ in that the investigator of public opinion is interested in broad attitudes common to large groups of people rather than the refinements of individual differences. Thus a three-point scale may be used for separating out groups holding an opinion with different intensity, and no attempt made to differentiate between the intensity of feeling within each group. It is not impossible that a comparison of the further reactions of such generalized groups may provide information of considerable value to psychologists.

J. G. F.

A Social Psychology of War and Peace. By MARK A. MAY. Yale University Press: the Institute of Human Relations (London: Humphrey Milford). 1943. Pp. ix + 284. 18s. 6d. net.

Much the most interesting chapters in this book are the first and the last. In the first, called "Why War?", Prof. May gives a very able description and analysis of the various theories which have been advanced concerning the causes of war; and wisely concludes that almost all the suggested causes have played their part at one time or another. Moreover, war is the outcome of contemporary conditions and of underlying principles of social behaviour which determine many other social phenomena, the study of which may throw light on the origins of war. The main body of the book attempts to discover and trace out these principles under the general heading of 'social conditioning'. It will be understood therefore that Prof. May's study is made from the 'behaviorist' point of view. Thus it deals with "learning to hate and fight", "to fear and escape", "to love and defend", "to follow leaders", in a manner made familiar by Dollard and other members of the Institute of Human Relations. The psychological generalizations made in these and the following chapters seem fairly unexceptionable as far as they go; although, referring, as they do, to items of behaviour without much consideration of the individuals behind the behaviour, they sometimes seem rather sporadic and uncoordinated. But for the greater part of the book little information can be deduced from these generalizations as to what will happen in any particular case, because almost all the special historical, political and social issues which really determine such a case are ignored. Thus one longs for the more specific treatment of, for instance, Margaret Mead's *The American Character*.

However, in the last chapter Prof. May comes to earth and uses, it appears, his inspired commonsense plus his understanding of international politics, rather than his psychological data, to produce, first a brief but interesting study of the swing over of public opinion in the U.S.A. between the years 1920 and 1941 on the issue of going to war. And in the last section of the chapter, entitled "But What of the Peace?" (which should be published as a separate pamphlet if this has not already been done), he lays down the reasons why it is so important that the United Nations should formulate their peace aims, not vaguely and generally as in the Atlantic Charter, but specifically and definitely, as an aid to their own morale and an inducement to the enemy to capitulate. Granted, many writers have already done this, but few so clearly and convincingly. Lastly, Prof. May demonstrates that a wise and far-seeing international policy for the future must demand sacrifices of national sovereignty from the victors as well as from the vanquished. Statesmen must not ignore the fact that change in public opinion as regards these matters is necessary and not impossible to bring about. But in order to do so, an understanding is essential of the basic social attitudes, convictions, ideals, etc., which determine public opinion.

Total War and the Human Mind. A Psychologist's Experience in Occupied Holland. By A. M. MEERLOO. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1944. Pp. 78. 5s. net.

Short as it is, in many respects this is a book of most outstanding interest and merit. The author is a Dutch psychiatrist, a Major in the Netherlands Army. He describes, in a perfectly straightforward, factual and patently fair-minded way, his own experiences and observations in German-occupied Holland. There is no careless, thoughtless, or merely emotional condemnation. Major Meerloo is, though he has suffered much, prepared to seek reasons for apparently unreasonable behaviour which at least make it psychologically understandable. The story that is told is gloomy but tremendously impressive; its psychological lessons are indicated as clearly and as relentlessly as the facts upon which these are based are recounted.

Some of the book is on the plane of general psychology, having to do with propaganda; with fear, its causes and expressions; with "democracy and fascism within us"; with courage; with delusion and mass delusion. This is unequal. Some of it, especially about propaganda, is first-rate; some of it, especially about fear, is partial and very incomplete; and some of it, especially about political theories and attitudes, is speculative and unduly simplified. All of it is interesting.

It would be a good thing if the book could be circulated freely and read carefully by the greatest possible number of people. And even if everything else is forgotten it is to be hoped that the essence of what is said in the chapter called "The Psychological Preparation of the Next War" will be for ever remembered.

Italian or American? The Second Generation in Conflict. By IRVING L. CHILD. New Haven: Yale University Press (London: Humphrey Milford). 1943. Pp. 208. 18s. 6d.

It is already certain that the post-war world will be full of difficult problems arising from the contact of differently organized social groups. Any specific study of this kind of situation therefore ought to receive the most careful consideration, especially by social psychologists and anthropologists. In this book Dr Child describes an investigation into the results of contact between second generation Italian immigrants and the current American social setting.

The treatment, deeply interesting as it is, is rather formally circumscribed. He takes as his model experimental situations in which animals or persons are confronted with two or more divergent possibilities of action. Then the different possibilities may be treated both as punishable—which gives an avoidance-avoidance reaction; both as rewardable—which gives an approach-approach reaction; or both may be treated as rewardable and punishable—which gives the "double approach-avoidance conflict" reaction. The first two types of reaction are, Child considers, not often found in real life, and the third separates into: (1) a rebel reaction, where the rewards of the new culture are regarded as superior to its punishments and potent over both rewards and punishments of the old; (2) an in-group reaction, where the rewards of the old culture are regarded as superior to its punishments, and potent over both rewards and punishments of the new; (3) an apathetic reaction where all rewards and punishments involved are about equally effective.

This bald and inadequate statement of his scheme cannot do justice to the real value of Child's treatment. His methods are described clearly and will be found to be widely applicable. His discussion of the three main types of reaction, the rebel, the in-group and the apathetic, is well documented, convincing, and shows the main directions in which they are likely to move. All of these reactions however are shown to result in compromise behaviour and the essential instabilities of this receive less attention and less illustration than they deserve.

The experimental situation contemplated has to do with paths of movement over a flat surface and is so arranged that a genuinely synthetic solution of the conflict induced is impossible. This is certainly not always the case in real life. It is difficult to believe that no Italians of the second generation have achieved a really integrated behaviour based upon something more than, or different from, a balance of competing rewards and punishments.

But within its limits the book is a significant study, containing a very large number of vitally important suggestions. It should stimulate many further studies of a kind that most assuredly must be made if anything like a widely stable social order is to be achieved.

Fear in Battle. By JOHN DOLLARD. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1932. Pp. 83.

Yale University and the Rockefeller Foundation provided the resources for the research the results of which are set forth in this monograph. No price is quoted and perhaps the booklet is intended for private circulation only. It is, however, of very great interest and value and it is much to be hoped that the study will be made as widely available as possible. Three hundred war veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade contributed the material by completing "an arduous questionnaire". The findings are stated with great clarity, exhibited in admirable graphical form, and briefly but judiciously discussed. They deal with the following main questions: the incidence, symptoms and commonest occasions of battle fear; the chief determining objectives of such fear; the positive values of fear to the soldier and his unit; the disadvantages of fear; the important controlling factors in fear. All the detailed items under these headings are set forth in terms of their distribution in the experience or in the opinions of the group of soldiers concerned. It is of course very likely that the distribution would be found to differ in different groups. Nevertheless, the results show great unanimity of both opinion and experience on most points. This factual approach to a topic which is usually discussed in terms of general theory deserves very wide circulation.

Frustration and Aggression. By JOHN DOLLARD, LEONARD W. DOOB, NEAL E. MILLER, O. H. MOWREER, ROBERT R. SEARS. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd. 1944. Pp. ix+150. 10s. 6d. net.

This is a republication of an original published by the Institute of Human Relations, Yale University Press in 1939, and reviewed in this *Journal*, vol. xxx, part 3 in 1940. It does not appear that the original edition has been revised in any way which, in the light of what we have learnt about aggression since 1939, seems a pity.

Psychology and the Soldier: The Art of Leadership. By NORMAN COPELAND. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1944. Pp. 96. 5s. net.

The author of this book would have done better to have given it its subtitle alone—*The Art of Leadership*. Much of what he says about Leadership, Discipline and Morale is good commonsense, expressed clearly though perhaps rather more dogmatically than is warranted in any generalization on such complex subjects. Indeed, he is at his best and most convincing when giving specific advice on particular topics such as how the junior officer should give instructions to his men. But though the author may have some knowledge of psychology, what he says is not supported by any systematic evidence, or by any psychological analysis or reasoning; and is merely illustrated by anecdotes about, for instance, Napoleon and Lord Roberts. He would have been well advised to avoid an appeal to knowledge which on such topics as those connected with leadership is of little service unless very well digested and skilfully applied.

Exploring the War Time Morale of High-School Youth. By L. J. CRONBACH. American Association for Applied Psychology: Stanford University Press (London: Humphrey Milford). 1943. Pp. 79. 8s. net.

After considering a number of suggested definitions, the author decides that "morale is the tendency of the individual to predict realistically the hardships or lack of hardships he will face in the future". It turns out that what he really thinks is that morale varies directly with this tendency, and that it is an easier tendency to measure than others which may be relevant. Accordingly, he made up a list of 70 items, some of which were regarded as optimistic—as, "Shortages will occur only in items people can easily do without"; and more pessimistic, as, "Taxes will rise so high people can buy only the necessities of life." Each statement had to be marked as (1) certain to happen; (2) more likely to happen than not; (3) equally likely to happen or not to happen; (4) probably will not happen; or, (5) certain not to happen. The results were scored in the usual manner on a five-point scale, from +2 to -2 on optimistic items and from -2 to +2 on pessimistic items. 2049 subjects of both sexes and various age grades, all from the state of Washington, contributed their opinions. The results are analysed in most of the ways customary in this kind of investigation and are set forth very clearly. The author considers that they principally show that morale should be thought of rather as an individual than as a group characteristic. On the whole the outlook of his subjects is characterized as realistic, but with a pretty strong pessimistic minority. In his sample girls were more pessimistic than boys.

The investigation is a good model of its kind. Whether its results can be taken seriously, and in what ways, are matters for much argument.

African Intelligence. By S. BIESHEUVEL. Johannesburg. P.O. Box 97: South African Institute of Race Relations. 1943. Pp. viii + 225. 7s. 6d. net.

The author's primary purpose in writing this book was to controvert the conclusions of Dr L. Fick, stated in a monograph, *The Educability of the South African Native*, that "... the available objective data point to a marked inferiority on the part of the Native in comparison with Europeans. This inferiority, occurring in certain tests in which learning or environmental conditions are equalized for the Native and European groups, does not appear to be of a temporary nature... the inferiority of the Native in educability, as shown by measurement of their actual achievement in education, limits considerably the proportion of Natives who can benefit by education of the ordinary type beyond the rudimentary." Dr Fick's conclusions were based upon the marked inferiority of the test scores of African children and adolescents in South African native schools on individual performance tests (such as Formboards, the Knox Cube test, the Porteus Maze test) and school achievement tests, to those obtained by white South Africans. In criticizing the above conclusions, Dr Biesheuvel makes a very thorough analysis of all the conditions that must be controlled or allowed for before such a comparison of test scores is valid. The influences on test performance of poor home environment and upbringing, inferior school teaching, malnutrition, lack of interest and unsuitability of test material, are so much greater and more widespread for native than for white children that at present it is quite impossible to select comparable test groups, or even to establish a basis for comparing them.

Dr Biesheuvel's study is a fairly damning piece of evidence against any attempt to prove a fundamental inferiority in the African's potential intelligence as long as his place in society remains such as it is in the Union of South Africa. But the study has wider implications of importance to psychologists, with regard to the whole question of the comparative intelligence testing of groups differing widely in culture and social status, environmental conditions, and fundamental interests. Even if the environmental conditions could be controlled or equated, as might be possible in other parts of Africa, there remains little doubt that the content and type of performance demanded by intelligence tests, even of the performance type, make little appeal to the African; such intelligence as he possesses does not, and possibly cannot, express itself along those lines. It yet remains to be seen whether it is possible to find any test situations in which the intelligences of both the African and the European can function readily enough to be really comparable. Moreover, it is just as important that this difficulty should be faced in testing different social groups with different customs and interests, even when they are of the same race and nationality. Dr Biesheuvel is to be congratulated on his clear and detailed discussion of these problems.

The Brush Foundation Study of Child Growth and Development. I. Psychometric Tests.

By ELIZABETH EBERT and KATHERINE SIMMONS. Washington, D.C.: Society for Research in Child Development, National Research Council. 1943. Pp. xiv + 113. \$1.50.

The two main studies of this monograph are of the variation in I.Q. on the 1916 and 1937 Stanford Binet tests and Otis S-A test at various ages from 3 to 15 years; and on the Merrill-Palmer scale for pre-school children and the Kent-Skaow Form Board series for children aged 5 to 14. Inter-test correlations are worked out, and correlations for the same test, both cross-sectional (different children at different ages) and longitudinal (the same children at different ages). In general the previous finding is confirmed, that the greater the difference in age of testings, the less the correlations. The range of changes in Binet I.Q. for different children in a group of 181 children is very large, e.g. from -40 to +33 points between 3 and 5 years, and from -18 to +29 points between 8 and 10 years. The type and magnitude of change are dependent on age, sex, absolute intelligence and mother's education. Nevertheless, the test scores do have some predictive value for later years. But the Merrill-Palmer and performance tests are not highly predictive of later Binet I.Q.'s.

Additional studies included in the monograph are of the prediction of scholastic achievement by various intelligence tests given at the same and earlier ages; of the Minnesota Mechanical Ability and Porteus Maze tests, which were not found to be very satisfactory; and of sibling resemblances in the various intelligence tests.

BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY

THE USAGE OF CERTAIN TERMS IN
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY

The Council of the British Psychological Society has considered the usage of certain terms current in fields of professional work in psychology, and regards the following definitions as acceptable. There is no implication of enforcing, but only of encouraging, the use of the terms in accordance with these definitions. Moreover, they are open to revision at any time.

Psychologist. One who has made a special study of the science of psychology. Professionally: One whose knowledge of psychology and experience in psychological work have reached the standard required for Associateship of the British Psychological Society.

Educational Psychologist. A psychologist who uses the science and methods of psychology in the field of education.

Child Psychologist. A psychologist who specialises in the psychological problems of childhood. More narrowly: A psychologist who is experienced in remedial work with individual children.

Vocational Psychologist. A psychologist who uses psychological methods in order to advise on the fitness of individuals for particular occupations or types of occupation.

Industrial Psychologist. A psychologist with a special knowledge of industrial problems who uses psychological methods in order to study and improve the conditions of the worker and to promote his occupational proficiency and well-being.

Psychological Medicine (Psychiatry). That branch of medicine which is mainly concerned with emotional and other mental disorders.

Psychiatrist. A physician who specializes in psychological medicine (psychiatry).

Psychotherapy. The direct application of psychological methods in the treatment of emotional and other mental disorders, psychosomatic disorders and social maladjustment.

Psychotherapist. A psychologist (medically qualified or not) who practises psychotherapy.

Psycho-analysis. (i) The investigation of unconscious mental processes by the method devised by Freud. (ii) The body of knowledge concerning unconscious mental processes, including the theoretical formulation of the data acquired by means of that method. (iii) The use of that method for therapeutic purposes.

Psycho-analyst. A psychotherapist who makes use of psycho-analytical methods.

Lay Analyst. A psycho-analyst who is not medically qualified.

Social Psychologist. A psychologist who applies psychological methods to the study of social groups.

Play Therapist. A psychotherapist or psychotherapeutic assistant who makes special use of play in remedial work with children.

The following terms, which are often currently employed, are not necessarily meaningless but are, in the opinion of the Council, liable to too much ambiguity and misunderstanding to be used by the Society. Medical Psychologist; Neuropsychiatrist; Academic Psychologist; Clinical Psychologist (the term 'clinical' should be confined to its medical usage).